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Searching for a Place to Call Home:
The Challenges Facing Europe’s
Cosmopolitan Citizens
Jessica L. Hawkinson

I. Introduction

A

uthor Ulrich Beck writes that processes of globalization encourage a sort of “transnational place polygamy,” in which migrating
individuals become attached to “several places at once, belonging in
different worlds” through a process of cultural mixing, adaptation, and
the “globalization of biography.”1 For students, modern professionals,
and even tourists, increased opportunities to travel, study, and work
abroad magnify the “globalization of biography” that Beck identifies.
For migrant communities, however, the experiences of “transnational
place polygamy” can often be more harrowing than the experiences of
the average tourist or student. Indeed, many families and communities
find themselves stretched painfully between multiple localities across
thousands of miles. In the search for belonging, many individuals find
that “home” no longer corresponds with political, legal, or territorial
boundaries. In addition, many find official acquisition of European or
Western citizenship and residence increasingly difficult or impossible.
Macalester College’s Institute for Global Citizenship program on
Globalization in Comparative Perspective provides a particularly
appropriate context from which to analyze the complexities of globalization and the difficulties of transnational identity formation faced by
migrants. This essay serves as a capstone to my research and experiences as a student at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)
at the University of London, and at the University of Maastricht in the
Netherlands. Despite the vastness of comparative possibilities between
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the two semesters abroad, the central focus of my independent research
is an exploration of the legal obstacles that are faced by minority communities seeking to integrate into European society. The goal is to
reflect on the challenges of legal integration for ethnic minorities in
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The essay will conclude
that obstacles to pluralism represent the larger difficulties that states
confront in managing globalization and dynamic international affairs.
In order to meet the stated goals, this article will be divided into four
main parts. The first will describe in more depth the area of focus and
outline its importance. The second part will apply relevant research
materials and experiences from my first semester studying in London,
while the third section will rely on resources from a second semester in
Maastricht, Netherlands. A final component will explore the relevance
of “globalization of biography” to the larger phenomenon of globalization itself.
II. Definition of Focus and its Importance
The modern era of globalization is characterized by unprecedented
movement and migration—of capital, cultures, ideas, and people—
both across and within borders. The movement of people can be a
positive development, particularly where multiculturalism nurtures
tolerance, cultural exchange, and innovation. In contrast, individuals who embody multiple cultural codes can come into conflict with
the traditional state conceptions of minority rights, citizenship, and
cultural identity. The focus of this essay approaches the phenomenon
of globalization from a cultural perspective, using theories from both
political science and international studies. While the globalization of
culture can be studied from a variety of perspectives (the most common being related to anthropology, philosophy, and the humanities),
viewing the cultural impacts of globalization from the perspective of
current international affairs and law offers two advantages. First, the
field of political science offers strong theoretical traditions which help
define the role of the state and its relations with other state and nonstate actors in the international system. The growing robustness of
the European Union and the increasing number of migrants crossing
European borders are phenomena that challenge traditional political
theories and encourage new ones. Secondly, the impact of multiple
cultures on individuals and national polities is most clearly illustrated
in the legislation and political rhetoric emerging from international
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political affairs. Legislation that places increased restrictions on “nonWestern” migrant communities is of particular importance as a result
of its relevance to increased isolationism following the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, and the attacks in Madrid and London in 2004
and 2005. Understanding state legislation is equally valuable for its
ability to reflect attempts at creating national political identity—often
to the detriment of migrants and aliens seeking entry or asylum.
The topics of multiculturalism and transnational identity are vital
for a variety of reasons. One of the most important results of increased
migration and the amalgam of cultural codes it creates is that the
nations of the world are forced to re-evaluate the relevance of traditional territorial identities in light of increasing cosmopolitanism. The
plurality of identity identified by Beck and others speaks to a larger
discussion of global citizenship and global community.2 For nationstates that have retained their sovereignty for centuries, global citizens
are often seen as obstacles rather than assets. Fragmented legal and
political responses to immigration, integration, and citizenship represent the dilemmas of cultural globalization facing states today. As
Will Kymlicka notes, “finding morally defensible and politically viable
answers” to the challenges of diversity and human rights is “the greatest challenge facing democracies today.”3 In the end, pluralism and
global citizenship offer unique theoretical challenges for scholars, but
they are most important for their potential to redefine the nature of
democratic statehood in an era of globalization. Cosmopolitanism and
the recognition of multiple cultural identities could provide a unique
avenue for defining a global community based on democratic values.
A final note on the European geographical focus should also be
put forward briefly. Pluralism and multicultural developments in the
European Union are of particular relevance today. First, the birth and
growth of the European Union illustrates another facet of globalization: supranational economic and political governance. This supranational element may prove vital in creating political structures that
accommodate global citizenship. Secondly, the European Union, one of
the most ambitious transnational integration projects to date, has introduced legislation that gives foundation to the rights and obligations of
European nationality and citizenship. This legislation makes it the first
non-state polity that can confer the rights and obligations of citizenship. Third, in sharp contrast to the apparent success of this universalizing political effort, the shift toward multiculturalism and pluralism
is a continuous struggle for the democracies of the European Union.
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Legal resistance to non-Western immigration and waning support of
ethnic minorities in many European countries confirms this conflict.
Finally, as a result of my research in Great Britain and the Netherlands,
geographical narrowing was convenient. A more thorough comparative study would benefit from the inclusion of both additional European and non-European cases.
III. Research from the Fall Semester in the United Kingdom
A. History of Multiculturalism in the United Kingdom
The Institute for Public Policy Research estimates that 678,000 individuals born outside of the United Kingdom currently call London home.4
Despite the existence of diverse cities like London and statistics that
suggest a non-white ethnic minority presence of almost 8% across the
whole of the United Kingdom, the struggle to welcome difference is
still very real for politicians and policymakers. This section will briefly
outline the modern development of the ethnic minority presence in the
U.K. This diversity is apparent upon walking through London streets
filled with diverse languages, schools, places of worship, outdoor markets, and restaurants. The goal of this section is to offer a synopsis of
the obstacles ethnic minorities face when attempting to become a part
of British society. Engaging primarily with texts and case studies from
a SOAS course entitled Ethnic Minorities and the Law, the section will
outline the ethnic minority presence in the U.K., followed by reflections on British perspectives on pluralism and national identity. The
section will conclude with several case studies relevant to the topic of
ethnic minority integration and citizenship in the U.K.
As a result of Britain’s colonial past, the issue of migration and
citizenship has been a prominent one in British legislation. As Randall
Hansen notes, “at the empire’s peak in the twentieth century some
600,000,000 individuals had the technical right to enter the UK and
avail themselves of all the rights now associated with British citizenship.”5 Though small groups of minority communities existed before
the 1940s, much of the significant immigration occurred under the
1948 British Nationality Act, which still maintained the right of colonial subjects to enter the U.K. freely.6 From 1948 until 1962, the existing
British Nationality Act supported the entrance of over 500,000 nonwhite British subjects from the Commonwealth. As ethnic minority
communities grew, the U.K. was forced to recognize the foundations of
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a multicultural society. Throughout the 1950s, however, the liberal British perspective on the freedoms of Commonwealth subjects began to
change.7 As a result, changes in legislation in 1962 increased immigration controls and discouraged non-white migrants from seeking entry
into the U.K.8 Although a variety of legal developments discourage
multicultural migration, Great Britain has not been able to ignore the
reality of an existing and significant multicultural community. European migration has also played a role in the development of an ethnic
minority presence, while migration from New Commonwealth countries in the West Indies, the Indian subcontinent, and East Africa has
solidified Britain’s status as a multicultural polity.9 As Hansen notes,
the predominantly non-white immigration from “new” commonwealth countries peaked in the years leading up to 1962.
Despite legislative changes that continue today, however, Britain’s
multicultural community continues to grow both in size and diversity. According to the 2001 Census, half of the U.K.’s non-white ethnic
minority population is of Indian, Pakistani, or Bangladeshi origin.10
This amounts to over three percent of the total population. Additionally, just under two percent of the total population, or around 25 percent of the ethnic minority population, represents black Caribbean and
black African communities.11 Individuals with mixed ethnic identity
represent 1.2 percent of Great Britain’s total population, and account
for approximately 15 percent of the ethnic minority presence.12 As current events and security concerns prompt worries over a diversifying
population, Britain’s policymakers and academics continue to contend
with the subject of ethnicity in law. The current failure to accommodate
difference and define a dynamic British identity suggests that the U.K.,
like other European nations, is finding it difficult to navigate a road
towards pluralism.
B. Legal Obstacles
Several perspectives on integration and pluralism underlie the legislation on immigration and nationality in the U.K. Whether legislation
demands assimilation or searches out pluralism, the confusion and
incompleteness of many laws suggests an incomplete and multifaceted
understanding of what a multicultural democracy should embody.
Several legal developments will be discussed here. The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act marked the first time that immigration
and nationality legislation began to define British nationality in terms
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of United Kingdom residency and “belonging,” rather than by official
citizenship and passport possession.13 Under the 1962 Act, a system of
labor vouchers was employed in order to police the entry of unskilled
workers. Particularly those with non-white ethnic backgrounds were
affected.14 As Randall Hansen writes, the most important impact of the
legislation was to deny “millions of largely non-white ‘colonial’ British subjects across the globe” the rights and opportunities normally
associated with British nationality.15 The 1962 Act was the first of many
changes that would radically redefine the British legal approach to the
immigration and naturalization of ethnic minorities.
The second significant change in British legislation was the 1971
Immigration Act. This Act officially codified the earlier Acts of the
1960s, and also introduced a system of immigration “rules” that,
although not legislation, could be used as legal guidance for the administration of the Act.16 These rules often meant that immigration officials
could haphazardly interpret the 1971 Act. The 1971 Immigration Act
had serious consequences for Commonwealth subjects seeking entry
into the U.K. While the 1962 Act established the recognition of differences between passports issued under U.K. central authorities and
those issued by colonial offices, the 1971 Act reinforced these differences through a new concept known as “patriality.”17 Beginning with
the 1971 Act, Commonwealth subjects seeking entry clearance to the
U.K. would need to prove that either they or their parents or grandparents were born on U.K. soil.18 In short, the 1971 Act had the permanent
effect of placing “Commonwealth citizens on the same legal footing as
aliens for the purposes of immigration.”19 For many Commonwealth
subjects from former British colonies in Africa, the impact of the 1971
Act was particularly acute. Indeed, the 1971 Act was initially conceived
as a way to quell official and public resistance to the possibility of a
mass immigration of Kenyan Asians with British nationality following Africanization policies in Kenya.20 Nuruddin Farah also notes that
opposition to African migration was later repeated when the British
Nationality Act of 1981 was passed in response to the immigration
of Ugandan Asians following their expulsion from Uganda under Idi
Amin’s rule.21 Though the 1971 Act was not a direct result of the Ugandan crisis which occurred in 1972, Ugandan Asians, many of whom
also held British passports, were either accepted into the U.K. as refugees or were turned away if they could not prove patriality under the
stringent provisions of the 1971 Act.22 Nonetheless, the 1971 Act had
obvious implications for Commonwealth citizens seeking the protec-
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tion of the British government, particularly in cases in which independence movements brought civil unrest and governmental instability.
From the perspective of the Commonwealth, the 1971 legislation
meant an oppressive immigration regime which closed the doors of
British legal rights to anyone who could not prove patrial family lineage, U.K. birth, or a five-year residence permitted by labor vouchers.23
In contrast, Great Britain may have viewed the 1971 Act as a way to
prepare itself for the arrival of European migrants upon its entry into
the European Union in 1973. As Sanjiv Sachdeva explains, the 1971 Act
reflected a move toward European Economic Community provisions,
which gave European citizens primacy over those from the colonial
states.24 Britain’s efforts to meet the demands of European Union membership are not enough, however, to excuse the global implications of
the 1971 Act. As Nuruddin Farah writes, the 1971 Act had a clearly
“racist logic” underneath it—a logic that meant “one was treated differently if one came from what was referred to as the Old Commonwealth…Ready to join…the European Community, Britain has lately
negotiated away its imperial responsibility.”25 Whether the 1971 Immigration Act is a matter of Britain’s successful European integration or
one of postcolonial irresponsibility, its impact on Commonwealth subjects and the atmosphere of exclusion it has created continue to exist
today.
Perhaps the most important legal development after the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act is the more recent British Nationality Act
of 1981. The 1981 Act radically redefined the legislation surrounding nationality and citizenship in the U.K. and the Commonwealth.
Its most important effect was to replace the more liberal 1948 British
Nationality Act with three new types of citizenship that made distinctions between full British (or patrial) citizenship, British Dependent
Territories Citizenship, and British Overseas Citizenship.26 As Andrew
Geddes writes, the creation of official British Overseas Citizenship (or
BOC) largely stripped Commonwealth citizens in East Africa of any
rights associated with their ties to British nationality.27 For the countless individuals who had once been considered British nationals under
colonial rule, the 1981 legislation meant that their British citizenship no
longer had any rights associated with it.28 In the end, even the strictest legislation embodied by the 1981 Act could not completely close
Britain’s doors to the flow of family members and asylum seekers who
would cross its borders in the decades following the new Nationality Act. Try as it might, the U.K. and its government officials cannot
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ignore the reality that Britain is a growing multicultural polity with the
potential to be either innovative or destructive in the development of a
cosmopolitan democracy.
While the challenges regarding the immigration of British Overseas
Citizens have not disappeared altogether, more modern attempts to
control immigration have centered on the control of asylum applications. The 1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act, the 1996 Asylum
and Immigration Act, and four additional Acts on immigration and
asylum between 1999 and 2006 are the most recent attempts to manage
immigration. While the impact of the earlier Acts can be evaluated, the
scholarly research on the most recent Acts is limited or nonexistent.
Because of space constraints, the modern legislation will be discussed
more generally, outlining its universal impacts and motivations. The
1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act was the first to respond
to massive increases in immigration during the period from 1989 to
1993. One impact of this Act was to introduce a body of legislation that
dealt specifically with “the backlog of asylum cases” that confronted
officials in the early 1990s.29 The legislation limited not only the number of asylum-seekers who were given official refugee status, but also
withdrew the government provision of housing for asylum-seekers.30
Even so, the 1993 Act did not officially have an impact on the number
of applications for asylum overall; indeed, the applications continued
to rise dramatically after 1993.31 Even so, the 1993 Act had the impact
of increased refusals and a decrease in the numbers of asylum-seekers
given Exceptional Leave to Remain, or ELR. As a Home Office report
notes, “In 1993, 48 per cent of initial decisions were to grant ELR and
46 per cent were refused asylum. In 1995, 16 per cent were granted ELR
while 79 per cent were refused.”32
The Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996 also sought to limit asylum applications by denying many asylum-seekers welfare and housing benefits, and the absence of government efforts to remedy the
social and economic deprivation that plagued the majority of asylum
communities placed crushing responsibility on local organizations,
which developed temporary, improvised, and uncoordinated solutions
to widespread problems.33 Additionally, the 1996 Act removed the
right of appeal within the U.K. for asylum-seekers who first traveled
through another country considered “safe” by immigration officials
before arriving in the U.K.34 Overall, as Andrew Geddes observes, each
new Act passed on asylum between 1993 and today has “sought to
correct the errors of the previous legislation.”35 The result, in the end,
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is a collection of asylum legislation that seeks both to close off external borders and to build more complicated internal measures for discouraging asylum applications.36 Despite a legacy of tough legislation,
however, the newest legislation passed in 2002 may hold some promise
for a successful multicultural Britain. The 2002 legislation in particular
began to seek out alternative routes to “positive immigration” in the
form of the Highly Skilled Migrants Program. Increased attention to
anti-discrimination legislation may also encourage new approaches to
pluralism in the U.K.37 In the end, beginning to understand the social
and legal impacts of immigration and nationality legislation will be an
essential first step in moving forward the discussions about pluralism
and integration in the United Kingdom and worldwide.
IV. Research from the Spring Semester in the Netherlands
A. History of Multiculturalism in the Netherlands
According to authors Jan Lucassen and Rinus Penninx, waves of immigration and emigration in the Netherlands have existed for more than
four centuries.38 Although the discourse and political rhetoric about
these “newcomers” has changed over time, the challenges remain the
same. Despite the long history of immigration in the Netherlands, this
section is concerned specifically with the more modern realities of
newcomers in the period following the Second World War.
Following the end of World War II, three categories of migration
can be identified in the history of the Netherlands: those migrating for
political reasons, as a result of economic factors, or as asylum-seekers.39 First, the Netherlands saw an increase in political migration as a
result of independence movements in its colonial territories. The first
important group of migrants was from the Dutch colony in Indonesia.
Lucassen and Penninx estimate that from 1945 to 1965, around 300,000
migrants traveled from Indonesia to settle in the Netherlands.40 Following Japan’s occupation of Indonesia between 1942 and 1945, about
120,000 Dutch nationals escaped political persecution and instability
to return en masse to the Netherlands.41 In addition, these hundreds
of thousands of native Dutch were joined by 180,000 mixed DutchIndonesians (who were born to at least one Dutch parent and chose
Dutch nationality over Indonesian nationality).42 Finally, the migration of a third group of Moluccans resulted from political instability
in Indonesia in the late 1940s. Originally, the Moluccans served in the
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Netherlands Indies Army and opposed the Indonesian government’s
rule in an effort to gain Moluccan independence.43 The Indonesian
government refused to negotiate with the Moluccans, and the Netherlands government eventually agreed to allow the temporary migration of 12,500 Moluccans to the Netherlands.44 Initially, the Moluccans
were housed in camps in the Netherlands, forbidden to work, and
completely isolated from the larger Dutch society.45 Beginning in the
1950s, the Moluccan community numbered approximately 32,000, and
they were increasingly granted work opportunities and relocated to
Dutch towns.46 Despite these attempts at integration, a Moluccan terrorist group, comprised of second-generation Moluccan immigrants,
carried out a series of attacks on Dutch soil between 1975 and 1978.47 In
1977, terrorist occupation of a school and attacks on a Dutch train led
to a forceful reaction on the part of the government to free hostages.48
Following the attacks in 1977, Moluccan terrorism ceased. Now a more
successfully integrated community of Moluccans and their descendants numbers around 40,000.49
A second group of colonial migrants arrived between 1973 and 1975,
when the approaching independence of Surinam threatened to bring
an end to the substantial benefits of Dutch citizenship for the Surinamese.50 Though the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 1954
allowed the free movement of Surinamese citizens, the expiration of
this provision upon Surinamese independence meant that thousands
of Surinamese sought to take advantage of their “last chance” at the
full rights associated with official Dutch citizenship. In 1975 alone, the
Netherlands saw almost 40,000 Surinamese cross the Dutch border,
bringing its population in the Netherlands to just over 100,000.51 In the
end, almost a third of the Surinamese population immigrated to the
Netherlands.52 Provisional data for the year 2007 estimate that more
than 300,000 individuals of Surinamese origin or second-generation
descent currently reside in the Netherlands.53
The second major reason for immigration to the Netherlands was
a result of economic incentive, illustrated first by government supported guest-worker programs introduced in the 1960s, and later by
more modern permanent economic migration.54 The first workers were
recruited from Spain and Italy, though a larger percentage arrived
from Turkey, Morocco, and Tunisia during the mid-1960s. Like many
other countries in Western Europe, the Dutch government believed
that these “guest” workers would be resident in the Netherlands for
the short term only, and the migrants initially acted under similar sen-

68

Jessica L. Hawkinson

timents. Again in following with other European countries at the time,
the Netherlands ended its guest-worker programs in 1974, following
the 1973 oil crisis, which led to massive economic restructuring and a
decrease in the need for foreign labor.55 Though migration had existed
for decades, the Netherlands began to realize quickly that the guestworker population was determined to stay.
More modern immigration as a result of economic motivations has
been the more common type of movement since the 1970s. This development has transformed the demographic composition of the minority presence in the Netherlands.56 Many of the Italians and Spaniards
recruited during the 1960s returned to their home countries when labor
opportunities declined, though large numbers of Turks and Moroccans
stayed and invited their families to the Netherlands.57 Family formation also increased in the 1990s, as legal migrants invited spouses from
their home countries to the Netherlands. Lucassen and Penninx write
that by 1992, “the Turks and Moroccans constituted the largest groups
of immigrants in the Netherlands (250,000 and 195,000 respectively)
after the Surinamese.”58 Today the Turkish community in the Netherlands exceeds 360,000, if second-generation Turkish are included.59
In addition to political and economic migrants, large-scale asylum
applications to the Netherlands began in 1974 following the end of
official guest-worker programs. Rising trends in asylum applications
began in the 1980s, with a record number of over 52,000 in 1994 alone.60
Applications have decreased dramatically since 1994, although they
increased between 2004 and 2005, when 12,350 applications for asylum
were received.61
In conclusion, the modern history of migration in the Netherlands
is both dynamic and multi-faceted. One report suggests that communities of non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands are as large as
1.6 million, or ten percent of the country’s population.62 According
to the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, first- and second-generation individuals with at least one parent born abroad make up 19.4%
of the population in the Netherlands.63 The climate of immigration
in the Netherlands may be changing yet again, influenced largely by
the social tension that has increased following the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in November 2004.64 Restrictive immigration
and asylum policies, and continuing debates over family reunion and
the social integration of minority groups suggest that the history of
immigration to the Netherlands is far from complete.
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B. Legal Obstacles
The challenges of migration and the growth of multicultural communities in the Netherlands parallel a changing legal regime of immigration,
integration, and asylum policies. Despite innovative commitments to a
more inclusive and respectful “minorities policy” during the 1970s,
contemporary immigration and integration policies have moved away
from a focus on multiculturalism toward a focus on civic integration,
or inburgering, policy.65 From the 1970s until today, two competing
approaches have pursued divergent legal and political solutions to the
challenges of a multicultural Dutch society.
The first approach toward minorities policy, prevalent between the
1970s and early 1980s, was a result of “pillarization,” or verzuiling,
which defined a political system of “institutionalised separateness” for
Dutch religious and cultural communities.66 Though the recognition
of separate pillars largely disappeared in the 1960s, policies directly
affecting minority groups were influenced by the “identity-affirming”
qualities of pillarization, though the recognition of separateness had
largely disappeared by the 1960s.67 Perhaps the most influential legal
development reflecting the affirming approach of this early period was
the 1983 Minorities Policy. According to Andrew Geddes, this policy
“saw the Netherlands as a multi-ethnic society with the expression of
ethnic differences by immigrants an important part of their social identity, which should be protected.”68 The policy contained three central
goals which advocated the promotion of minority equality before law,
the promotion of “multiculturalism and the emancipation of ethnic
communities,” and improvements in the social and economic realities
of minorities.69 Combining legal equality with equal opportunities, the
1983 Minorities Policy embraced a method for integration that did not
require a renunciation of unique cultural identities.70 Dutch policies
granting voting rights to residents with third-country national status
after five years of legal residence make the Netherlands, to this day,
one of the few states to grant limited political participation rights to
non-nationals.71 Despite concerted attempts at encouraging a pluralistic minorities policy, political changes and historical evaluations slowly
began to erode the ambitious steps toward multicultural integration of
the 1970s and 1980s.
It is difficult to pinpoint a single year or event between the 1980s and
today that decided the official decline of the plural minorities policy,
though several trends greatly stimulated the rising popularity of fewer
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multicultural integration policies. First, political and academic statistics in the late 1980s began to reflect a growing gap of inequality and
marginalization between native Dutch and minority communities.72 As
a result, political sentiments shifted, and multiculturalism was challenged by individuals seeking to encourage a universal commitment
to “the Dutch way of life.”73 This new commitment is illustrated most
recently by the introduction of the 2006 Integration Abroad Act and the
2007 New Integration Act. While the 1983 Minorities Policy “explicitly
safe-guarded” the cultural autonomy of minorities and rejected forced
assimilation, modern policies focus on civic integration through inburgering, or integration through adaptation.74 Among other conditions,
the New Integration Act and the Integration Abroad Act place an obligation on individuals applying for residence status in the Netherlands
to achieve integration through an “integration programme…consisting
of courses in Dutch and social and vocational orientation, career planning, social guidance.”75 The New Integration Act and the Integration
Abroad Act follow legislation made with the 1998 Law on the Civic
Integration of Newcomers, which requires “500 hours of language
training and 100 hours of civic education” in order to meet integration
requirements.76
In addition to changing political sentiments surrounding the process of integration, the increasing size, diversity, and economic status
of ethnic minority and immigrant communities confronted policymakers at the turn of the century.77 Several legislative changes beginning
in 1984 attempted to calm the growing excitement over the evolving identity of Dutch minority communities. First, the Nationality
Act of 1984 presented significant challenges to newcomers seeking
naturalization. The 1984 Act followed an attempt by right-wing politicians to reduce minority naturalization through a bill that would
have excluded Surinamese immigrants from a “rapid naturalisation
procedure…for persons who had lost their Dutch nationality.”78 While
the 1984 Act was not as openly xenophobic, two modifications “were
clearly related to the desire to restrict immigration.”79 First, the Act
abolished the option for non-Dutch women to choose Dutch nationality after marriage to a Dutch citizen.80 As Groenendijk and Heijs note,
this change had the effect of reducing the number of marriages whose
primary purpose was to acquire Dutch nationality. A second provision
granting stateless children born in the Netherlands Dutch nationality
was also removed—introducing a three-year residence requirement,
which would have the effect of preventing children born to stateless
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Roma and Moluccan parents from acquiring Dutch citizenship.81 This
same rule was also used to prevent stateless children’s parents from
acquiring residence status and eventual citizenship. Overall, the shift
in approaches to migration has been significant, and political and legal
debates are far from over. In an era of globalization that encourages
transnational communities and the free movement of people and cultures, modern democracies face challenges unlike any seen in the past.
V. Citizenship, Identity, and Belonging in an Age of Globalization
Identifying the growth of multiculturalism among the world’s nations,
along with state responses to this pluralism, is a useful first step in
understanding that globalization demands innovative changes for the
world’s individuals and polities. Macalester’s endeavor to explore the
phenomenon of globalization within the context of a two-semester program abroad is a unique example of a forum in which an understanding of global citizenship can be cultivated. In my own particular case,
two semesters in different European Union member states provided me
with the opportunity to explore multicultural citizenship from the perspectives of the state and minority communities. Despite the economic
innovation embodied in the progress of the European Union, political
and legal jurisdiction still lies predominantly with state governments.
Often this negatively impacts the potential successes of cosmopolitan
citizens. The modern nation-state in many cases attempts to “discipline
away” the complexities and dynamism of human cultures and plurality of identity, while the cosmopolitan forces of globalization nurture
and increase “transnational place polygamy.”82 Furthermore, multicultural individuals find it difficult to identify solely with a national
identity that is more stagnant than dynamic. It is an inescapable reality
that the identities of individuals are no longer, if they ever were, tied to
a single locality. In both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, as
well as across the member states of the European Union and the world,
globalization is challenging both state sovereignty and national identity. This is especially clear with the phenomenon of global citizenship.
As John Tomlinson writes, the world is faced with the fact that “the
shrinking of distance and complex interdependence of the globalization process produces what we might call ‘enforced proximity.’”83 In
other words, it is becoming much more difficult for individuals and
states to dismiss the reality of a growing global society. Individuals are
increasingly aware that choices made in their own lives have global
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impacts, and states are equally conscious that isolation and homogeneity are no longer acceptable in an international community. With
its variety of potential dangers and innovative promises, embracing
a global cosmopolitan society may be the only way to manage the
pluralities of identity that accompany a growing population of cosmopolitan citizens. As Tomlinson suggests, cosmopolitanism may be
“the sort of cultural disposition people living in a globalized world
need to cultivate.”84 It is also important to note that cosmopolitanism
would not “insist that all values are equivalent, but would emphasize
the responsibility that individuals and groups have for the ideas that
they hold and the practices in which they engage.”85 A world of global
cosmopolitanism would not be a cultural “free for all,” but would represent a world in which individuals can maintain their local identities
while being able to “think beyond the local to the long-distance and
long-term consequences of actions…and be able to enter into an intelligent relationship of dialogue with others who start from different
assumptions.”86 The state cannot, of course, be held wholly responsible
for cultivating global citizens, but it is nonetheless the obligation of
democratic polities to support their citizenry in the creation of the type
of cosmopolitanism that Tomlinson and others identify. Cosmopolitanism is both the promise and the risk of globalization, and it may also
be the answer to effectively weathering globalization’s storms. Many of
globalization’s best navigators are also its authors. Global citizens who
redefine their identities with each cross-border excursion not only feel
the pressures of globalization, but they are also the newest members of
a growing global community. With the help of strong democratic leadership, these citizens stand ready to encourage successful structures
for global governance and international accountability. Like many of
the international organizations that guide the global community today,
however, the support of the world’s states is a necessary element for
growth. Indeed, the strength of the democracy in an era of globalization may depend on the nation-state’s capacity to begin cosmopolitan
dialogue with its citizens and the rest of the world.
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VI. Conclusion
From the multicultural marketplaces and international avenues of central London, to the household worries about “those people taking our
jobs” in small towns throughout England, and to the larger fear of
terrorism caused by threats on U.K. soil, the impact of diversity can be
felt. In the small city of Maastricht, Netherlands, cosmopolitanism can
be found in the kebab and satay restaurants, and in the multilingual
Dutch, French, and English conversations, which are a daily occurrence
between the Dutch and Belgian borders. The impact of cosmopolitanism can also be found in the potentially oppressive “whiteness” of
the city’s permanent population and in the stereotypes that minorities
face when trying to become “Dutch.” The potential of cosmopolitanism, of course, is neither absolutely positive nor negative. At its best,
cosmopolitanism can support a multicultural community of endless
diversity and cultural change, brought together in global responsibility and accountability. At its worst, the presence of cultural diversity
can become oppressive—breeding hatred, violence, and illusions of
cultural and moral supremacy that threaten to separate the world into
culturally based centers of opposition. In either case, the role that the
nation-state plays in the current decades is essential in creating a global
environment in which the core values of democracy can be given cosmopolitan relevance. As many of the world’s global citizens search for
a place to call home, their globalized biographies can be an instructive
way to explore the potential of cultural diversity and cosmopolitanism
that is nurtured by the powerful forces of globalization. In the end, for
all of us to call the world “home” would be a powerful step toward the
creation of an international community with the capacity to confront
some of the most pressing global challenges. 
•
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